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ABSTRACT
Road networks are vulnerable to natural and man-made disruptions. The loss of
one or many critical links of the network often leads to increased traffic congestion.
Therefore, quantitative models are necessary to identify these critical assets so that
actions can be taken by decision makers to mitigate the impact of disruptions.
This paper proposes an optimisation model to identify the set of arcs that, when
lost, results in the worst congestion under user equilibrium traffic. The model is
formulated as a bi-level non-linear problem. The challenging formulation is solved via
a customised version of Greedy Randomised Adaptive Search Procedure (GRASP)
meta-heuristic. Computational experiments are run on a dataset of artificial grids
and managerial insights are provided based on popular Sioux and Berlin network
case-studies.
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1. Introduction
Transportation networks are the backbone of every country and due to their impor-
tance to the well-being of communities and societies are considered Critical Infrastruc-
ture. Nowadays, commodities are transported mostly on the road via trucks. This is
particularly true if we focus on local transportation or transportation within neigh-
boring countries. In 2017 more than 65% of US-NAFTA merchandise was carried by
trucks. Rail lagged well behind with about 15%. Other transportation modes (air, ves-
sel, pipeline) carried less significant shares of commodities (Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, 2017a). Similarly, in the UK about 76% of goods are moved by road (Depart-
ment for Transport, 2016). Road is generally the main transportation mode also when
it comes to move people. Again, looking at the US, between 2000 and 2015 almost
90% of journeys to work were made using personal vehicles (Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, 2017b) whereas in the UK in 2015 about 64% of trips were covered by cars.
Developing countries are even more vulnerable to road infrastructure disruptions as
they often lack alternative transportation modes. As a consequence, disruptive events
can render these countries incapable of accommodating the entire flow of people and
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commodities.
Because of this critical socio-economical role, disruptions of road networks often take
a high economic toll. During 2015-2016, the UK was hit by intense rainfall leading to
widespread flooding. The welfare cost of road disruption is estimated to be roughly
a hundred million pounds. Focusing on the UK road network, the challenges road
transportation is facing are evident. In fact, approximately only 2% of UK roads
accounts for more than 30% of the total traffic. This clearly indicates that some parts
of the network are more critical than others. For example, in 2016 serious floodings
led to the closure of main road A591 in Cumbria, disrupting almost 7000 trips a day,
for about 6 months (Environmental Agency, 2018). Currently, the UK Environmental
Agency estimates that 10% of the UK road network is vulnerable to flooding.
Particular care in the management of this infrastructure must be applied by coun-
tries prone to natural events. Vulnerability analysis has to be implemented also in the
wake of climate changes which are bound to generate extreme events more frequently
(NASA).
In addition to weather related disruptions, roads are also vulnerable to small scale
events such as car accidents, leading to road closure and consequent impact on travel
times.
When it comes to road management, quantitative methods are frequently imple-
mented to rank assets of the infrastructure according to some vulnerability metrics.
These rankings are then used to identify the most critical assets of the infrastructure.
The information is then used by decision makers to build contingency plans or de-
sign network enhancements. This paper contributes to the body of research devoted
to assess vulnerability in a road transportation network. An optimisation model is
introduced to identify the most vulnerable components in a road network under risk
disruption. We focus on strategic risk (Golany et al., 2009) by modeling worst-case
disruptions. This approach should be considered as complementary to the probabilistic
risk one. Decision makers require both perspectives when budget allocation decisions
have to be made and people’s livelihood is at stake. To better capture the impact
of disruptions on the system’s congestion, the road network is assumed to be a User
Equilibrium (UE) network. Every driver aims to minimise his own trip’s cost and the
UE is achieved once no driver can reduce his cost via unilateral actions. This is also
known as the Wardrop’s first principle (Wardrop, 1952).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an in-depth
review of the relevant literature. In Section 3, the optimisation model is introduced
and described. Section 4, focuses on the algorithmic approach used to efficiently solve
the complex formulation. A computational analysis of the algorithm is implemented
using grids of different sizes. Section 5, applies the model to Sioux fall and Belrin
Friedrichshain case-studies to provide an example on how the results can be used to
support decision-making. Finally, conclusions and future developments are discussed
in Section 6.
2. Background
Research on disruption management for Critical Infrastructure is vast and keeps evolv-
ing at a fast pace. That is particularly true for both supply-chain and transportation
infrastructure. The problem can be inspected from different angles. For example, some
researchers have focused on the design stage, to build infrastructure that are inher-
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ently resilient (Cadarso and Maŕın, 2016; Laporte et al., 2011; Martel et al., 2013;
Tran et al., 2017). Focusing on road networks, design models have been studied in-
vestigating aspects such as robustness and resiliency in presence of different types of
uncertainties. For instance, Ukkusuri et al. (2007) study the problem under stochastic
demand. They propose a Genetic Algorithm to minimise the expected travel costs
together with standard deviation across scenarios. Dimitriou et al. (2008) propose a
reliable design model to hedge against uncertainty in demand, supply and drivers’
behavior. Kepaptsoglou et al. (2014) shift the focus to the post-disruption phase by
simultaneously deciding on highway design and recovery operations so as to maximise
the performance of the surviving system. A comprehensive review of papers studying
resiliency of transportation systems can be found in Mattsson and Jenelius (2015).
In this paper, we assume the transportation system to be pre-existent and we focus
on the pre-disaster stage.
This section focuses on papers that develop quantitative approaches to assess the
vulnerability of a road system. Normally, the road system is modeled as a network of
nodes and arcs, hence we broaden the scope of the analysis to network vulnerability
in general.
Within this scope, two broad categories of approaches to assess vulnerability can
be identified: vulnerability metrics and mathematical optimisation models.
2.1. Vulnerability metrics
This line o fresearch focuses on identifying vulnerability metrics to rank the different
assets of a network. The usual approach is to measure the system’s performance in a
normal state and in a post-disruption state after an asset (or sometimes a group of
assets) is inoperable. The vulnerability of the network toward that asset is measured in
terms of the delta between pre and post-disruption states. Within this framework, the
main difference among research papers is how the system’s performance is measured.
Many have developed structure-based metrics whereby vulnerability is assessed as
a function of features such as connectivity, shortest path, node-betweenness etc. For
example, Wang and Rong (2009) introduce a node-degree driven metric for a power grid
vulnerable to cascade attacks. Yin and Xu (2010) compute the efficiency of Shanghai
road network as the sum of the recripocal of the shortest paths. The vulnerability of
Beijing railway transit network is evaluated by Sun et al. (2018) in terms of node-
degree, betweenness and strength.
Another transportation feature that is frequently embedded into vulnerability anal-
ysis is the accessibility. The concept of accessibility is modeled in different ways but
generally is built around socio-economical and behavioral criteria. In Sohn (2006),
accessibility indices are computed for each county using factors such as population,
shortest path, average traffic etc. Taylor et al. (2006) use the Hansen integral index
which defines accessibility as a function of the attractiveness of a location. The same
index is used by Luathep et al. (2011) in a large-scale vulnerability analysis study
applied to the Bangkok metropolitan area. Taylor and Susilawati (2012) propose a
metric for regional and remote areas based on the concept of remoteness, defined as
the inverse of the accessibility.
A further approach more closely related to road transportation exploits concepts
such as flow or congestion to build vulnerability metrics. For example, Jenelius et al.
(2006) rank arcs and nodes of a road system by building two metrics called importance
and exposure. These metrics are based on the increase of the travel cost when an ele-
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ment is inoperable. Scott et al. (2006) argue that metrics based on the volume/capacity
ratio fail to capture system-wide impacts and introduce the Network Robustness In-
dex. This index is computed by evaluating the User Equilibrium of the network after
removing one arc. The same approach is used by Sullivan et al. (2010) to build a
system-wide metric called Network Trip Robustness. These approaches are extended
by Jenelius and Mattsson (2012), where the focus is on disruption scenarios where
spatially correlated arcs are simultaneously inoperable. Watling and Balijepalli (2012)
develop a moment-based method to compute vulnerability in terms of travel times
while also taking into account the potential impact of demand growth. El-Rashidy
and Grant-Muller (2014) use fuzzification and an exhaustive search optimisation to
aggregate different metrics based on both physical properties (length and number
of lanes) and network flow. Jin et al. (2017) focus on non-structural disruptions, i.e.
events that lead to a capacity reduction for an arc rather than a total closure. Kerman-
shah and Derrible (2017) measure robustness of Chicago and New York road networks
to extreme flooding by comparing the number of pre and post-disruption trips. Leng
et al. (2018) build a metric based on a generalised travel cost accounting for vehicle
cost, travel time, and traveller comfort.
2.2. Optimisation models
Single disruption approaches are generally not too cumbersome from a computational
point of view and can be applied to large networks. However, they can be misleading
when multiple correlated and uncorrelated disruptions are considered as they can-
not accurately capture the system-wise implications of complex disruption scenarios.
Events like strikes (Yahoo News, 2016) or floods (Lansing State Journal, 2019) can
result in the disruption of multiple segments of a road network. Therefore, when the
focus is on larger disruptive events, mathematical optimisation models are best suited
(Starita et al., 2017a). Many researchers have investigated the problem of identify-
ing road criticalities and planning for road enhancements assuming a probabilistic
risk (Faturechi and Miller-Hooks, 2014; He and Liu, 2012; Ishfaq, 2013; Starita et al.,
2017b). Within this stream, several works have studied approaches to measure and op-
timise robustness and resilience of the network. For example, Chen and Miller-Hooks
(2012) propose a mixed-integer formulation to assess the recovery capabilities of a road
system under capacity and travel time uncertainty.
In this work we focus on worst-case scenario models instead. These models allow one
to identify the most critical arcs with respect to a given performance criterion, such
as congestion. A worst-case scenario is usually modelled as a game between two actors
with opposite aims: the Interdictor (or attacker), is a proxy to identify most critical
assets. It uses a limited amount of resources to inflict the highest damage to the system
(for instance, by disrupting a number of arcs). The User minimises/maximises the
system’s cost/benefit. This game is often formulated as a bi-level optimisation model
(Brown et al., 2006) and referred to as Interdiction problem. Research in this area has
gained momentum in the past 15 years with the focus being primarly on supply-chain
infrastructure (Akbari-Jafarabadi et al., 2017; Aksen et al., 2013; Church et al., 2004;
Losada et al., 2012).
Building on the seminal paper by Richard Wollmer (1964), a number of studies
have appeared studying the interdiction problem on flow-based transportation net-
works. Wood (1993) and Kelly J. et al. (1998) propose mixed-integer formulations
for the deterministic and stochastic max-flow interdiction problem. Different formu-
4
lations and solution approaches are considered by Murray et al. (2007), Myung and
Kim (2004), Lunday and Sherali (2012), and Soleimani-Alyar and Ghaffari-Hadigheh
(2018). Afshari Rad and Kakhki (2013) add the temporal component to the problem
along with a solution algorithm based on Benders Decomposition. Rad and Kakhki
(2017) focus on the computational challenge of the model by providing an efficient
re-formulation and a set of valid inequalities.
Focusing on distance-based networks, the shortest-path interdiction problem is in-
troduced by Fulkerson and Harding (1977) and later on formulated as a mixed-integer
problem by Israeli and Wood (2002). Wei et al. (2018) extend the shortest-path in-
terdiction with the aim of finding the minimum resources needed to increase the path
length to a given threshold. Bidgoli and Kheirkhah (2018) propose a vehicle-routing
interdiction problem to inspect how logistics profits are vulnerable to arc disruptions.
They also assume asymmetry of information between interdictor and user.
The models described above are suitable for many infrastructure systems, however
they do not take into account the congestion and drivers behavior typical of a road
infrastructure. For example, a model based on a shortest path can be applied to a
road network only under the strong assumption that every arc is free of congestion
and drivers always choose the shortest path. Typical features of road transporta-
tion systems are better captured by Traffic Assignments models that aim to compute
the so-called User Equilibrium (UE). Mathematical formulations and algorithms have
been proposed to find the UE, which is a traffic flow assignments that satisfy the
Wardrop’s first principle. Specifically, at UE the travel time on all used paths is equal,
and (also) less than or equal to the travel time that would be experienced by a single
vehicle on any unused path (Sheffi, 1985). In other words, at equilibrium, no driver
can individually decrease its travel effort by choosing a new route. To the best of these
authors’ knowledge, the interdiction problem on a User Equilibrium network has not
been investigated so far. Numerous papers investigate the problem of road network
design problem (Bruynooghe, 1972; Poorzahedy and Turnquist, 1982) which can be
formulated using a similar bi-level structure to our interdiction problem. However, the
model introduced in this paper is applied to a different context, with the objective of
informing decision makers about critical hot-spots of the network and where to invest
to mitigate the impact of disruptions. To summarise, the main contributions of these
paper are:
• Formulating the Interdicion problem on User Equilibrium networks
• Introducing a GRASP inspired heuristic to efficiently solve the problem
• Presenting a case study on the Sioux and Berlin networks to illustrate how the
model can be used to inform decision-makers.
3. A User Equilibrium based interdiction model
3.1. Mathematical formulation
This section introduces the formulation for the bi-level UE interdiction model. We
focus on a road network, modelled as a directed, weighted graph G(N,A), where N is
the set of nodes and A the set of arcs. Traveling time on a given arc a is a function
ta() of the traffic flow on that arc. The objective of the model is to identify the set
of arcs that, when disrupted, would yield the highest system’s cost. In our problem,
the system’s cost is measured as the product of traffic flows and travel times. The
model takes into account the impact of congestion by computing the user equilibrium
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in the inner level. The outer level models the actions of the interdictor whose aim is to
maximise the system’s cost. We assume that no traffic is allowed on a disrupted arc and
the interdictor can disrupt up to R arcs. The overall model’s notation is summarized
below:
Sets, indexes and parameters:
• N is the set of nodes
• A is the set of links
• r, s are indexes used for nodes
• a is the index used for links
• Krs is the set of paths connecting origin r to destination s
• k is the index used for paths
• qrs is the trip rate between origin r and destination s
• R is the number of disrupted links
• δrsak is a binary parameter equal to 1 if arc a belongs to path k, connecting origin
r to destination s; 0 otherwise
• ta = ta(xa) is the actual travel time of a link a, defined as a function of the
traffic flow on the link.
Decision variables:
• xa is the flow on link a
• ω auxiliary flow variable used for integration
• f rsk is the flow on path k connecting origin r to destination s
• ya is the interdiction variable equal to 1 if arc a is disrupted; 0 otherwise
The User Equilibrium Interdiction Model (UEIM) is formulated as follows:
[UEIM] maximize
y
∑
a∈A
xata(xa) (1)
subject to
∑
a∈A
ya ≤ R (2)
ya ∈ {0, 1} ∀a ∈ A (3)
minimize
x,f
∑
a∈A
∫ xa
0
ta(ω)dω (4)
s.t.
∑
k∈Krs
f rsk = qrs ∀r ∈ N, ∀s ∈ N \ {s} (5)
xa =
∑
r∈N
∑
s∈N\{r}
∑
k∈Krs
f rsk δ
rs
ak ∀a ∈ A (6)
f rsk ≥ 0 ∀r ∈ N, ∀s ∈ N \ {s} , ∀k ∈ Krs (7)
xa ≤M(1− ya) ∀a ∈ A (8)
The upper level model (1)-(3) represents the interdiction problem. The aim of the
objective function (1) is to maximise the total system’s cost expressed as the product
of travel time and flow. Inequality (2) is the cardinality constraint on the maximum
number of disrupted arcs. Constraints (3) are the binary requirements for variables
ya.
The lower level model (4)-(7) is a standard User Equilibrium problem. The objective
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function (4) is used to compute the equilibrium flows of the network. Constraints (5)
state that the entire demand is to be served. Constraints (6) compute the total flow
traversing link a. Constraints (7) are non-negativity requirements for variables f rsk .
Finally, the set of inequalities (8) enforce that no traffic is allowed on a disrupted arc.
3.2. Solution approach
Solving UEIM is generally difficult because of its bi-level structure. In fact, linear
and non-linear bi-level programs have been proven to be NP-hard (Wiesemann et al.,
2013). The complexity of this type of problems has been widely discussed for the
transportation network design problem, where the role of the interdictor is replaced
by a network designer whose aim is to expand the network, given a limited budget.
Within this context many researchers have recurred to heuristic and meta-heuristic
approaches (Drezner and Wesolowsky, 2003; Kim and Kim, 2006; Poorzahedy and
Abulghasemi, 2005).
In this section, we propose a solution algorithm as a customised version of the
Greedy Randomised Adaptive Search procedure (GRASP) metaheuristic (Feo and
Resende, 1995). As in GRASP, the algorithm starts with an iterative step and at each
stage builds a solution by adding elements from a dynamic candidate set. The solution
is further improved via a search following the initial step. However, the algorithm is
different from standard GRASP in that it generates a list of best solutions, not just
the best found. Furthermore, driven by preliminary results, the standard local search
is replaced by a simple single-swap applied to the solutions of the list. Overall, we
refer to this algorithm as Multi-Start GRASP (MSG), since it basically consists in
re-starting the GRASP procedure a number of times, while keeping the best solutions.
A detailed description of the building blocks of the algorithm is given below.
3.2.1. Multi-Start GRASP (MSG) procedure
The algorithm builds tentative solutions by randomly choosing arcs to disrupt from a
dynamic candidate set. This set is updated at each stage so that it contains the most
promising arcs. The key decision is how to quantify the concept of promising from
the interdictor’s perspective. To this aim, the algorithm uses variables xa based on
the simple rationale that arcs that intercept higher flows are more likely to increase
the congestion of the system, when disrupted. In order to describe the pseudo-code
(shown in Algorithm1), we need to introduce some further notation. Let I be a dynamic
list keeping the best p solutions discovered, CS be the candidate set with the most
promising arcs and UE(y) be the User Equilibrium problem for a given interdiction
vector y.
At each iteration τ , the algorithm starts with an empty disruption set. The solution
is built by adding R arcs in sequence. To build the candidate set CS, the user equilib-
rium problem is solved for the given yτ . After a solution is built (i.e., R arcs have been
selected by setting the y variables to 1, accordingly), a final user equilibrium is solved
to compute the total system’s cost. This cost is then used to evaluate the solution
and decide if it should be stored or discarded. The algorithm ends after a pre-defined
number of iterations and returns the list of p-best solutions found.
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Algorithm 1 Multi-Start Grasp (MSG)
1: Empty list I
2: for τ = 1 to numiter do
3: yτ ← 0
4: for ν = 1 to R do
5: CS = ∅
6: Solve UE(yτ ) and retrieve flows xν
7: Sort arcs by flow (xν) in descending order
8: Populate CS with the first nν arcs
9: Randomly pick arc a from set CS
10: yτa = 1
11: end for
12: Solve UE(yτ ) and retrieve flows xτ
13: Compute system’s cost zτ =
∑
a∈A x
τ
ata(x
τ
a)
14: if yτ is among the p-best found then
15: add < yτ , zτ > to I and discard the worst solution if I is full
16: end if
17: end for
18: Return I
3.2.2. Single-Arc Swap (SAS) procedure
This search procedure is implemented to further improve the solutions generated by
the MSG step. The search performs an enumeration of the one-to-one swaps, replacing
one arc in the solution with another arc from the neighborhood. The pseudo-code is
described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Single-Arc Swap (SAS)
1: foreach i ∈ I do
2: for ν = 1 to R do
3: Let a be the νth disrupted arc in solution i
4: Swap out a (i.e., yia = 0)
5: Solve UE(yi) and retrieve flows xν
6: Build CS by adding the m best arcs (with respect to xν)
7: for a′ ∈ CS do
8: Swap in a′ (i.e., yia′ = 1)
9: Solve UE(yi) and compute system’s cost
10: Store if the solution improves the best found so far
11: Swap out a′ (i.e., yia′ = 0)
12: end for
13: Swap in a (i.e., yia = 1)
14: end for
15: end foreach
16: Return best solution
The starting point of this search is the set of best solutions obtained by MSG and
stored in list I. The search is performed for every solution in I. For a given solution
i ∈ I, disrupted arcs are individually swapped out and a full search of the neighborhood
is executed. Assuming a to be the arc swapped out from the initial solution (line 4),
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the neighbourhood is identified by solving UE(yi) and populating CS with the m
best solutions according to the resulting flow variables. All arcs in CS are sequentially
swapped-in to create a new solution. The system’s cost of each solution is computed
by solving the User Equilibrium problem (line 9). The best solution is stored and
returned after the end of the search.
3.2.3. Solving the User Equilibrium problem
Solving the bi-level problem necessarily requires an efficient algorithm for the user
equilibrium subproblem. This problem has been studied in-depth for decades and
the literature is rich with exact and approximate algorithms to compute the network
equilibrium. Expanding the literature on this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
We simply implement the convex algorithm defined in the seminal work by Sheffi
(1985), which is one of the most efficient algorithms to solve UE problems and quickly
converges to the equilibrium solutions.
4. Computational experiments
This section provides a computational analysis of the solution approaches introduced
before. The algorithms are written in C++ using Visual Studio and are run on a PC
with AMD Ryzen 7 1700 and 8GB RAM.
4.1. Instances generation
A set of artificial networks of different sizes is created to assess the accuracy and
scalability of the solution approaches. These networks are built as square grids (Fig.
1). Although artificially generated, these grids replicate the structure of many post-
industrial cities that are developed around the concept of city-block (Blumenfeld,
1949). Furthermore, grids can be easily scaled up, for this reason are frequently used
to build dataset to evaluate algorithms (Bekhor and Toledo, 2005; Chiou, 2005; Zhang
et al., 2014). Popular Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) formula is used to formulate the
relationship between travel times and traffic flows. Specifically, ta(xa) = t̄a(1+α(
xa
ca
)β),
where t̄a is the free-flow travel time (i.e., travel time on a when there is no congestion),
ca the nominal capacity of link a and α and β some traffic parameters.
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Figure 1. 16-nodes grid
While keeping the same network structure, the rest of the problems parameters are
changed across instances as indicated in Table 1. Values have been chosen looking at
past literature.
Table 1. Instances parameters
Parameters Choices
α 0.15
β 4
ca 1500, 3000, 4500
ta 4, 8, 12
The generation of the traffic demand requires a more detailed discussion. In order
to generate meaningful demand patterns in the networks, we build the qrs parameters
using a gravity model. The gravity model is used to reflect in the demand that areas
with higher population will generate and attract larger number of trips. To this aim,
a population popi of 300, 450 or 600 is randomly assigned to each node i. These values
are set so that the smallest demand zone will have half the population of the largest
one. Distances between nodes are then computed solving an all-pairs shortest path
problem (assuming free flow). Finally, the demand between any r and s is obtained
as the ratio between the product of respective populations and the square of their
distance, in accordance with the gravity model.
The population numbers are set purposely high so that the resulting networks are
always highly congested. To generate instances with different levels of congestion, we
run a scaling-down procedure with the following constraints:
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
xa
ca
≤ T congav (9)
10
xa
ca
≤ T congmax , ∀a ∈ A (10)
The first constraint is an upper bound on the average congestion, whereas the second
constraint limits the maximum congestion accepted on each link. The scaling-down
iterative procedure is described by Algorithm 3:
Algorithm 3 Scaling-down
1: while true do
2: Solve UE and retrieve flows xa
3: if Both (9) and (10) are satisfied then
4: break
5: end if
6: foreach p doair rs
7: qrs = qrs ∗ 0.9
8: end foreach
9: end while
The algorithm iteratively decreases the original flow demand by 10% until the re-
quirements on congestion are met. We generate a dataset made of congested networks
(T congav = 0.8 and T
cong
max = 1.5) and heavily-congested networks (T
cong
av = 1.2 and
T congmax = 2.5). The latter are identified by adding h as a suffix in their name. This
categorization is based under the common assumption that a link is congested once
the number of cars exceeds its capacity. Furthermore, we add to the dataset the pop-
ular Sioux and the Berlin Friedrichshain networks to analyse the problem on different
network structures and provide insights on case studies that have been frequently in-
vestigated in the past. The case studies are downloaded from the online repository
“Transportation Networks for Research” and their parameters are set according to
Leblanc (1975) (Sioux network) and Jahn et al. (2005) (Berlin network). A summary
of some structural features of the networks is given in Table 2. Note that Zones is
used to refer to nodes that generate and attract demand. This is used to differenti-
ate nodes that could simply represent intersections. In the artificial grids and Sioux
network every node is also a demand point, whereas out of the 361 nodes of Berlin
network only 26 are demand points. The table also list the average shortest paths
and a measure of transitivity computed as the ratio between the number of three-arcs
loops and two-arcs paths.
Table 2. Instances structural features
Demand Average
Name Nodes Arcs Zones OD Pairs Shortest Path Transitivity
16-x 16 48 16 240 13 0.00
25-x 25 80 25 600 16 0.00
36-x 36 120 36 1260 18 0.00
64-x 64 224 64 4032 24 0.00
100-x 100 360 100 9900 30 0.00
Sioux 24 76 24 552 11 0.07
Berlin 361 766 26 650 33 0.19
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4.2. Algorithms evaluation
In this section, results of the computational experience on the dataset are presented.
To provide a benchmark for our algorithms, we implement a complete enumeration
procedure where all the interdiction strategies are explored to identify the one(s)
yielding the highest travel cost. Unfortunately, this approach is applicable only to small
problems (i.e., up to 36 nodes). For larger instances, we implement a greedy algorithm
(RG) with a random starting point. Specifically, the interdiction set is initialised with
a randomly selected arc. Subsequently, the remaining R−1 arcs are sequentially chosen
using a greedy criterion. Specifically, every arc not yet in the solution is individually
added to the interdiction set and the system cost is computed. After all arcs are
evaluated, the one yielding the highest cost is permanently added to the solution.
Changing the starting arc results in different disruption strategies being evaluated.
The algorithm is iterated so that it solves the same number of UE problems as MSG-
SAS. As for the parameters of MSG-SAS, we allow the size of the CS (i.e., nν) to
linearly decrease from 12, when ν = 1 (i.e., the solution being constructed is empty)
to 2 when ν = 4. This choice is motivated by the observation that as the number of
arcs in the solution (identified by ν) increases, good candidate arcs are more frequently
found in the top ranking positions. The size of the CS (i.e., ) during SAS is set to 4.
The number of iterations is 500 for problems with R ≤ 3, 5000 when R > 3. Overall,
the number of UE calls is mostly defined by the MSG procedure, which needs to solve
numiter(1 +R) UE problems.
Tables 3, 4, and 5 compare results of the algorithms on small networks. The inter-
dictor budget R is set equal to 2, 3, and 4. Column Obj, lists the objective function
found by the enumeration procedure. Column CPU Time reports the computational
time in seconds. Finally, Gap column is the percentage difference between the best
solution found by any algorithm and the one found via full enumeration. For network
instances with 36 nodes and R = 4, the full enumeration is no longer computationally
feasible. In this cases, the Gap columns, report the gaps between the best objective
found by one algorithm and the absolute best objective found across all algorithms.
Statistical descriptors such as Average, Median, Interquartile range (IQR), max and
min are also reported in bold at the bottom of each table.
The tables show that MSG-SAS always return a 0% gap against the Enumeration
algorithm. This is a positive outcome as it is clear that a full enumeration approach
does not scale with the size of a problem and the number of disrupted arcs and, there-
fore, can only be used for small examples. Results also highlight that RG performances
are inconsistent as it sometimes finds good solutions but also return gaps as high as
82.9%. Its average gap ranges between 13% and 28%. However, in one occasion (36-1
and R = 4) RG outperforms MSG-SAS by 1.9%. The accuracy of MSG worsen when R
increases from 2 to 3, with respective average gap growing from 5% to 19%. The lower
average gap reported in Table 5 is due to the above mentioned impossibility of obtain-
ing solutions by full enumeration with 36-node networks. With the sole exception of
instance 36-1, the best solution is always found by MSG-SAS.
Looking at the computational times, the advantage of MSG-SAS against the full
enumeration is particularly evident with large instances and R > 2. For example, when
R = 3, MSG-SAS is on average two orders of magnitude faster and when R = 4 the
enumeration cannot be implemented for 36-node networks as it would require to solve(|A|
R
)
∼ 8M user equilibrium problems.
Given the randomness of the MSG procedure, it is worth investigating how robust
MSG and MSG-SAS performances are. To this aim, we perform a further analysis
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Table 3. Comparison of solution approaches when 2 arcs are disrupted (R = 2)
Enumeration RG MSG MSG-SAS
Instance CPU CPU CPU CPU
Name Obj Time(s) Gap(%) Time(s) Gap(%) Time(s) Gap(%) Time(s)
16-1 2204.2 1.1 34.2% 2.3 0.0% 1.6 0.0% 2.2
16-2 4950.1 1.1 1.8% 2.4 0.0% 1.6 0.0% 2.4
16-3 2258.8 1.3 0.0% 2.7 0.0% 1.9 0.0% 2.6
16-4 2103.5 0.9 17.1% 1.6 0.0% 1.2 0.0% 1.7
25-1 1935.7 7.3 0.0% 5.2 0.0% 3.6 0.0% 5.3
25-2 2411.2 8.2 28.1% 5.8 0.0% 3.6 0.0% 5.5
25-3 2246.7 8.7 44.1% 6.1 6.8% 3.9 0.0% 5.5
25-4 1700.5 9.4 0.0% 8.1 0.0% 4.3 0.0% 6.2
36-1 2544.4 40.5 21.2% 12.5 11.5% 8.9 0.0% 13.1
36-2 21758.5 82.5 54.6% 25.2 0.0% 19.5 0.0% 29.3
36-3 12631.1 68.9 39.4% 20.5 0.0% 15.6 0.0% 24.0
36-4 1823.6 39.5 5.7% 12.1 0.0% 9.1 0.0% 13.5
16-1h 17839.6 1.9 0.0% 4.0 0.0% 2.7 0.0% 4.0
16-2h 14112.7 2.2 0.0% 4.6 0.0% 3.0 0.0% 4.6
16-3h 39762.6 1.8 0.0% 3.8 0.0% 2.8 0.0% 4.3
16-4h 9292.1 2.5 0.0% 5.1 6.4% 3.3 0.0% 5.0
25-1h 32341.9 15.6 0.0% 11.1 0.0% 8.1 0.0% 12.3
25-2h 29647.7 15.1 62.9% 10.9 0.0% 7.5 0.0% 11.2
25-3h 6621.8 15.5 26.8% 10.6 0.0% 8.8 0.0% 13.2
25-4h 27179.5 14.2 0.0% 10.2 0.0% 7.2 0.0% 10.8
36-1h 28511.2 107.3 64.0% 33.6 64.0% 27.9 0.0% 40.5
36-2h 15387.6 87.5 31.4% 26.2 0.0% 20.9 0.0% 32.3
36-3h 16388.5 102.7 0.0% 31.4 25.2% 22.8 0.0% 35.2
36-4h 12977.8 80.8 28.1% 25.0 16.6% 19.1 0.0% 31.0
Sioux 2663.6 5.2 0.0% 3.9 0.0% 2.6 0.0% 3.8
Sioux-h 29692.2 21.0 0.0% 19.4 0.0% 12.1 0.0% 18.2
Average 28.6 17.7% 11.7 5.0% 8.6 0.0% 13.0
Median 11.8 3.7% 9.2 0.0% 5.8 0.0% 8.5
IQR 45.5 32.1% 15.7 1.6% 10.2 0.0% 15.4
Min 0.9 0.0% 1.6 0.0% 1.2 0.0% 1.7
Max 107.3 64.0% 33.6 64.0% 27.9 0.0% 40.5
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Table 4. Comparison of solution approaches when 3 arcs are disrupted (R = 3)
Enumeration RG MSG MSG-SAS
Instance CPU CPU CPU CPU
Name Obj Time(s) Gap(%) Time(s) Gap(%) Time(s) Gap(%) Time(s)
16-1 10930.8 17.1 51.0% 3.1 0.0% 2.2 0.0% 3.0
16-2 28775.6 18.5 22.8% 3.7 13.3% 2.4 0.0% 3.4
16-3 12904.1 19.8 0.0% 3.4 0.0% 2.7 0.0% 3.7
16-4 8925.2 13.7 0.0% 2.6 0.0% 1.8 0.0% 2.4
25-1 12051.5 190.1 69.7% 7.9 11.8% 5.3 0.0% 8.1
25-2 10463.0 198.8 57.5% 7.1 23.8% 5.2 0.0% 7.6
25-3 9224.7 216.2 42.8% 7.1 6.8% 5.3 0.0% 7.1
25-4 6637.8 231.8 1.5% 8.0 60.5% 6.0 0.0% 8.4
36-1 10681.7 1673.3 37.4% 18.1 59.6% 13.0 0.0% 18.6
36-2 71703.2 3629.1 39.3% 36.9 28.9% 27.6 0.0% 39.4
36-3 55237.9 2997.7 0.0% 31.8 67.8% 22.3 0.0% 32.4
36-4 9284.0 1598.5 70.5% 17.4 63.4% 12.0 0.0% 18.0
16-1h 61193.4 31.6 0.0% 5.8 0.0% 3.9 0.0% 5.4
16-2h 117441.0 38.6 23.6% 5.5 38.1% 4.6 0.0% 6.8
16-3h 368930.0 34.3 0.0% 7.2 6.0% 4.2 0.0% 6.0
16-4h 96677.3 41.1 0.9% 8.0 0.0% 4.9 0.0% 7.1
25-1h 111784.0 423.7 25.9% 16.2 26.2% 12.4 0.0% 17.3
25-2h 119014.0 405.8 4.5% 14.3 4.5% 10.9 0.0% 15.8
25-3h 76977.7 441.3 11.5% 17.4 11.9% 13.1 0.0% 19.8
25-4h 114635.0 398.6 12.7% 15.8 0.0% 10.7 0.0% 15.2
36-1h 172687.0 4436.6 65.5% 44.6 0.0% 36.1 0.0% 54.6
36-2h 218958.0 3625.7 70.3% 42.0 78.3% 30.5 0.0% 48.1
36-3h 124627.0 4231.3 82.9% 45.9 0.0% 33.8 0.0% 49.4
36-4h 80600.3 3360.3 38.1% 39.2 0.9% 27.9 0.0% 43.5
Sioux 6539.2 143.0 0.0% 5.2 0.0% 3.9 0.0% 6.0
Sioux-h 29.7 21.0 0.0% 25.4 0.0% 12.1 0.0% 18.2
Average 1093.7 28.0% 16.9 19.3% 12.1 0.0% 17.9
Median 224.0 23.2% 11.1 6.4% 8.4 0.0% 11.8
IQR 1970.8 52.6% 21.3 31.2% 11.3 0.0% 16.9
Min 13.7 0.0% 2.6 0.0% 1.8 0.0% 2.4
Max 4436.6 82.9% 45.9 78.3.0% 36.1 0.0% 54.6
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Table 5. Comparison of solution approaches when 2 arcs are disrupted (R = 4).
Enumeration RG MSG MSG-SAS
Instance CPU CPU CPU CPU
Name Obj Time(s) Gap(%) Time(s) Gap(%) Time(s) Gap(%) Time(s)
16-1 27599.9 205.8 0.0% 32.4 0.0% 28.8 0.0% 29.8
16-2 72826.3 230.1 0.0% 42.2 0.0% 33.6 0.0% 34.7
16-3 42836.1 235.4 11.4% 34.4 8.0% 35.2 0.0% 36.2
16-4 19864.6 166.6 0.0% 27.1 0.0% 22.9 0.0% 23.7
25-1 66175.7 3778.4 0.0% 108.4 0.0% 75.0 0.0% 78.4
25-2 53918.3 3987.7 3.1% 80.2 0.0% 69.6 0.0% 72.3
25-3 23207.9 4138.3 0.0% 71.4 0.0% 69.0 0.0% 71.1
25-4 29670.0 4482.2 31.0% 95.2 0.0% 78.6 0.0% 81.5
36-1 0.0† % 203.0 32.9† % 190.6 1.9%† 198.7
36-2 23.6† % 393.4 3.2† % 392.5 0.0%† 405.4
36-3 38.5† % 332.4 0.0† % 319.5 0.0%† 331.0
36-4 0.0† % 239.0 0.4† % 169.2 0.0%† 177.7
16-1h 235197.0 393.5 24.5% 53.9 0.0% 53.1 0.0% 54.5
16-2h 340356.0 471.1 14.9% 57.7 0.0% 65.6 0.0% 67.6
16-3h 1259220.0 406.7 0.0% 70.8 0.0% 58.0 0.0% 59.6
16-4h 482228.0 479.5 0.0% 66.9 0.0% 65.2 0.0% 66.9
25-1h 349404.0 8945.5 31.2% 139.1 0.0% 171.1 0.0% 176.2
25-2h 274589.0 8377.1 0.0% 141.7 3.0% 155.6 0.0% 160.1
25-3h 557922.0 9293.6 0.0% 182.7 0.0% 201.3 0.0% 208.4
25-4h 646824.0 8283.2 58.7% 143.5 0.0% 159.5 0.0% 164.2
36-1h 18.0%† 460.3 0.0%† 513.6 0.0%† 528.5
36-2h 66.8%† 504.7 66.8%† 440.0 0.0%† 455.8
36-3h 10.1%† 542.7 9.5%† 464.1 0.0%† 478.4
36-4h 6.4%† 470.1 0.0%† 393.5 0.0%† 410.0
Sioux 82376.3 2892.9 0.0% 59.0 1.3% 61.9 0.0% 65.1
Sioux-h 2576870.0 11439.9 0.0% 249.4 0.0% 259.6 0.0% 268.8
Average 3789.3 13.0% 184.7 4.8% 174.9 0.1% 180.9
Median 3335.7 1.5% 123.8 0.0% 117.1 0.0% 120.8
IQR 7952.7 23.8% 211.5 1.7% 213.6 0.0% 220.7
Min 166.6 0.0% 27.1 0.0% 22.9 0.0% 23.7
Max 11439.9 66.8% 542.7 66.8% 513.6 1.9% 528.5
†Percentage gap from the best solution found.
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on the grids for which optimal gaps can be computed, while changing the seed for
the pseudo-random function. The analysis is repeated 50 times and the objective
percentage gaps between MSG-SAS and Enumeration (averaged across all network
instances) are shown in Figure 2. The R = 4 case is excluded since no gaps can be
computed for the 36-node instances.
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Figure 2. Average gap (%) for MSG and MSG-SAS when R = 2 and R = 3, varying the random seeds.
The graphs highlights that MSG results are variable. When R = 2, its gaps range
between ∼ 3% and ∼ 10% with a standard deviation of 1.7%. This variability further
increases when R = 3, with the gaps often approaching 30%, while never being smaller
than 10% and the standard deviation rising to 4.2%. It is clear that adding the search
step after MSG has the benefits of bringing the gaps to negligible levels while also
reducing the aforementioned variability (standard deviation reduces to 0.1% and 0.6%,
respectively). A few sporadic outliers appear with MSG-SAS and R=3.Among these,
only two result in a gap greater than 1%.
The scalability of the algorithm is tested on larger grids and Berlin network. For
brevity, we report only the results when R = 4, since it is the most computationally
expensive in our analysis. Across all instances, MSG-SAS returns solutions far more
accurate than RG. The gap between the two procedures ranges between 54% and
328%.
Table 6. Computational results for larger net-
works (R = 4).
RG MSG-SAS
Instance CPU CPU Gap from
Name Time(s) Time(s) RG(%)
64 868 809 57%
64h 1,520 1,464 94%
100 2,600 2,366 328%
100h 5,925 5,644 54%
Berlin 5,869 5,673 211%
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5. Case Study
In this section we use the Sioux network to provide some managerial insights. The
network is again evaluated in congestion and high-congestion conditions.
5.1. Solutions Analysis
Figures 3 shows a graphical representation of the consequences of disruptions on the
traffic congestion. Arcs are drawn correlating thickness with congestion levels. Fur-
thermore, disrupted arcs are represented by dotted lines.
Figures 3a and 3b show the networks after a worst-case loss of R = 2 arcs. Similarly,
Figures 3c and 3d, show the post-disruption networks when R = 4. These results
suggest that the worst critical loss of 2 arcs (namely, 43 and 60) generates congestions
around nodes 17 and 19. When R = 4, 43 and 60 are still the most critical arcs, along
with 38 and 58. Their loss generates a vast congested area around nodes 11, 14, 15
and 23. This congestion is particularly severe for the high congestion case, as shown
by figure 3d. Overall, the figures suggest that arcs with high traffic tend to be also the
most critical. For example, arc 58 (from node 17 to 19) is the most congested after
the worst case loss of two arcs and consequently appears among the most critical arcs
when R = 4.
5.2. Comparison with Vulnerability Metrics
This analysis already suggests that when assessing vulnerabilities an important factor
is played by the correlation between arcs. To further explore this issue, we compare the
results of UEIM against some popular vulnerability metrics. One of the most frequently
used approach is to remove arcs (and nodes) one by one from the network and measure
the system’s performances before and after. Typically these performances are assessed
in terms of travel times or costs. The first metric considered is the importance of an
arc and or node (IMP) introduced by Jenelius et al. (2006). It is formally defined as
follows:
IMP (a) =
∑
r
∑
s 6=r qrs(c
a
rs − c0rs)∑
r
∑
s 6=r qrs
, (11)
where c0rs and c
a
rs are respectively the cost of travel from r to s with and without
arc a. In our analysis these costs are computed as the shortest travel time, assuming
free flow on each arc. In other words, the metrics does not account for congestion.
The second metrics being evaluated is introduced by Scott et al. (2006), referred to
as Network Robustness Index (NRI). This measure is defined as follows:
NRI(a) =
∑
a
xat(xa)δa, (12)
with δa equal to 1 if arc a is operational, 0 otherwise. In other words, the metric
evaluates arc a by removing it from the network, finding the new equilibrium and
assessing the cost increment.
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(a) Congested, with R = 2. (b) Heavily congested, with R = 2.
(c) Congested, with R = 4. (d) Heavily congested, with R = 4.
Figure 3. Interdiction plans and congestion on the Sioux network
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Table 7 compares the rankings of IMP and NRI with the solutions of UEIM, when
Sioux is heavily congested. The first three columns show rank and arc index for IMP
and NRI, respectively. The last column shows the UEIM solution obtained with the
R value reported in the fourth column. The table clearly highlights differences be-
tween the metrics and the UEIM’s solutions. In fact, when R is 2 the optimisation
approach suggests that arc 60 (together with 43) is the most critical asset. This is in
sharp contrast with both IMP and NRI which rank it 64th and 69th (out of 76 arcs),
respectively.
Table 7. Critical arcs according to IMP, NRI and UEIM
IMP NRI UEIM
Rank Arc Arc R Arcs
1 26 43 1 43
2 25 28 2 43 60
3 16 37 3 43 58 60
4 19 38 4 38 43 58 60
5 49 26 5 38 40 43 52 60
6 52 25 6 38 40 43 52 53 60
7 27 46 7 9 16 25 32 43 58 60
8 48 67 8 7 11 19 26 27 28 53 56
The difference between rankings and UEIM’s solutions is also evident when taking
into account the system’s costs. In the following analysis, we compute the total sys-
tem’s cost by sequentially disrupting an increasing number R of arcs, according to the
priority order identified by IMP and NRI rankings. Results are then compared with
the system’s costs generated by UEIM (assuming the same value of R).
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Figure 4. IMP, NRI versus UEIM. Relative error.
Results of this analysis are reported in Figure 4 displaying the relative gap between
metrics’ and UEIM’s objectives. Both congestion cases are evaluated. The graphs
show that the performances of these metrics quickly degrade as more disruptions are
considered. In fact, already for R equal to 2, IMP and NRI heavily underestimate
the vulnerability. For R greater than 4, the metrics return solutions smaller than
UEIM’s by one or even two orders of magnitude. The two graphs show differences
only for smaller values of R. For example, when R = 2, 3, the gaps obtained on the
congested network are smaller compared with the counterparts obtained on the heavily
congestion network (e.g., IMP gaps increase from about 20% to 60%, when R = 2).
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Overall, UEIM is a better way to assess network vulnerability to multiple failures as
it captures the interdependence among different components. The simultaneous loss
of several arcs can be much more severe than what the metrics suggest.
To see if similar results can be drawn on networks of different sizes and structures,
we perform the same comparison on the set of large networks considered section 4.
The results (Figures 5a, 5b) are indeed consistent with those observed on the Sioux
case study. In fact, as R increases, the gaps between NRI, IMP and UEIM approach
100% with small differences across networks.
2 3 4 5
R
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
64
64c
100
100c
Berlin
(a) IMP.
2 3 4 5
R
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
64
64c
100
100c
Berlin
(b) NRI.
Figure 5. IMP, NRI versus UEIM. Relative error on large networks.
5.3. Protecting the Road Network
This section discusses how UEIM can be used to support actions to decrease system’s
vulnerability. We assume that a limited number of arcs can be fortified and made
invulnerable to disruptions. For example, if the road infrastructure is vulnerable to
flooding, temporary and permanent barriers can be built along arcs to allow them
to withstand higher flooding levels. A thorough approach would require to explicitly
model this decision process. Formally, a third optimisation level (often referred to as
fortification level) is needed in the UEIM mathematical formulation to model the de-
cision of which arcs should be fortified, given a limited available budget. Examples of
fortification papers focusing on supply-chain, shortest-path and flow-based networks
can be found in Cappanera and Scaparra (2011); Church and Scaparra (2007); Starita
and Scaparra (2016, 2018). Unfortunately, this added optimisation level further com-
plicates an already challenging problem and a new solution approach would have to
be devised. Being aware of this and leaving this extension as a future development,
here we evaluate the benefits of using UEIM results to decide which arc to protect.
We compare three different decision making policies. Let us refer to Q as the number
of arcs to protect, IS as the set of most critical arcs generated by MSG-SAS and FS
as the set of fortified arcs defined by one of the following policies. The first policy, re-
ferred to as NRI-P, is based on the ranking according to NRI metric. For example, for
the high congestion case when Q = 3, FS = {43, 28, 37}. The second policy, referred
to as UEIM-P1, initialise FS to the IS obtained when R = Q. Finally, the following
pseudo-code describes the third policy, referred to as UEIM-P2.
UEIM-P2 iteratively selects which arcs to fortify by randomly choosing from the
set of most critical arcs generated by UEIM, assuming that arcs already in FS cannot
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Algorithm 4 UEIM-P2
1: it = 1; FS = ∅;
2: while it ≤ Q do
3: Solve UEIM to build IS, assuming that fortified arcs cannot be disrupted;
4: Randomly choose one arc a from IS;
5: FS ∪ {a} ;
6: it = it+ 1;
7: end while
be disrupted.
We test these policies by evaluating what is the worst case cost after loosing the 3
most critical unprotected arcs. Figures 6a and 6b show the percentage decrease of the
worst-case system cost (for both congestion cases) when an increasing number of arcs
are protected according to the different policies.
0 2 4 6 8
Q
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
P
os
t-
di
sr
up
tio
n 
co
st
 r
ed
uc
tio
n 
(%
)
NRI-P
UEIM-P1
UEIM-P2
(a) Congested
0 2 4 6 8
Q
0
10
20
30
40
P
os
t-
di
sr
up
tio
n 
co
st
 r
ed
uc
tio
n 
(%
)
NRI-P
UEIM-P1
UEIM-P2
(b) Heavily congested
Figure 6. Comparison among fortification policies.
In general, the two congestion cases do not show major differences. In both, UEIM-
P1 performs poorly, failing to reduce the post-disruption system’s cost. This is because
its fortification sets are based on worst case disruptions computed assuming an un-
protected network and therefore fails to adapt to new worst case solutions discovered as
arcs are being fortified. In fact, after successfully thwarting the worst-case disruption
when Q = 1, UEIM-P1 almost always fails to improve because the new worst-case sets
and the fortification sets have no arcs in common. In other words, UEIM-P1 too often
fortifies arcs that do not need fortification. A similar issue is faced by NRI-P, although
this policy manages to achieve a slightly higher cost decrement (about 8.8% and 5.8%
for congested and heavily congested, respectively). Overall, the graphs suggest that
both NRI-P and UEIM-P1 are not suitable policies to support fortification decisions.
Conversely, UEIM-P2 shows rather promising results. The system’s cost is gradually
reduced in both cases, as Q increases. The reason is that UEIM-P2 better tackles the
game between fortification and interdiction, by sequentially choosing arcs from newly
found interdiction sets. When Q = 8, UEIM-P2 reduces the post-disruption system’s
cost by 31.8% in the congested case. Not surprisingly, with high congestion the peak
reduction is even higher ( 37.3%) and achieved with fewer fortifications (Q = 6). This
can be explained with the potentially larger room for improvement to be expected in
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a highly congested environment.
The advantage of UEIM-P2 against the NRI-P and UEIM-P1 is further confirmed
when larger grids and the Berlin network are considered. Table 8 summarises the
post-disruption cost reduction obtained by all policies when Q = 1, 4 and 8. With
the only exception of grid 100 when Q = 1, UEIM-P2 always performs better. As
seen on Sioux network, the extent of the benefit of using UEIM-P2 increases with the
protection budget achieving cost reductions ranging from 15% to 65%.
Table 8. Post-disruption cost reduction(%) on large networks
when R = 3
Instance Name
Q Policy 64 64h 100 100h Berlin
1
NRI-P 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
UEIM-P1 0% 0% 64% 0% 0%
UEIM-P2 0% 29% 4% 3% 8%
4
NRI-P 0% 0% 24% 0% 0%
UEIM-P1 27% 0% 53% 0% 0%
UEIM-P2 44% 38% 54% 13% 14%
8
NRI-P 27% 0% 57% 13% 0%
UEIM-P1 0% 0% 53% 0% 8%
UEIM-P2 65% 56% 58% 15% 17%
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we propose an optimisation approach to assess road network vulnerabil-
ity. We introduce an interdiction model on an User Equilibrium network to estimate
the impact of worst-case disruptions on the congestion of a system. The bi-level non-
linear formulation is challenging to solve. Therefore, a heuristic inspired by GRASP is
developed. Computational results performed on artificial grids show that the heuris-
tic is fast and accurate. Furthermore, experiments on two real case studies, (Sioux
Fall and Berlin Friedrichshain) clearly show the benefit of incorporating results from
our model into the decisional process of planning for road network protections and
enhancements. Overall, the experiments prove that if multiple disruptions are consid-
ered, optimisation approaches are superior to approaches based on metrics. This is
because once an arc fails, the criticality of the other arcs changes. Static approaches
based on rankings cannot capture this issue.
Several lines of research can be pursued to further expand this paper. The first
natural extension will be to introduce a fortification level to explicitly include protec-
tion investment decisions. Focusing on natural hazards, it makes sense to introduce
geographically correlated disruption, as done by Liberatore et al. (2012).
One ambitious extension is assessing vulnerability within a multi-modal transporta-
tion context, where disruption over one infrastructure have a ripple effect on the others.
In general, the temporal component has been neglected in interdiction and fortification
models. For example, time can be included in the formulation in order to study inter-
esting cases such as sequential disruptions, protection with lifespans, interdiction and
disruption budget available over a time horizon, long-lasting impact of disruptions etc.
Another realistic extension would be to consider interdictions causing partial damages
(e.g., partial closure of a road, closure of some lanes etc.). These assumptions have al-
ready been considered in interdiction models applied to supply chain problems (Aksen
et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2016).
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Finally, these suggested extensions are bound to complicate the mathematical for-
mulation of the problem even further. Therefore, future developments within this re-
search area should include the exploration of new efficient solution procedures.
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